UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C. 20549

SCHEDULE 14A

Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Amendment No.)

Filed by the Registrant \boxtimes Filed by a party other than the Registrant \square

Check the appropriate box:

- □ Preliminary Proxy Statement
- □ Confidential, for Use of the Commission Only (as permitted by Rule 14a-6(e)(2))
- Definitive Proxy Statement
- Definitive Additional Materials
- Soliciting Material Pursuant to §240.14a-12

Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc.

(Name of Registrant as Specified In Its Charter)

(Name of Person(s) Filing Proxy Statement, if other than the Registrant)

Payment of Filing Fee (Check the appropriate box):

☑ No fee required.

- □ Fee computed on table below per Exchange Act Rules 14a-6(i)(1) and 0-11.
 - (1) Title of each class of securities to which transaction applies:
 - (2) Aggregate number of securities to which transaction applies:
 - (3) Per unit price or other underlying value of transaction computed pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 0-11 (set forth the amount on which the filing fee is calculated and state how it was determined):
 - (4) Proposed maximum aggregate value of transaction:

(5) Total fee paid:

□ Fee paid previously with preliminary materials.

- Check box if any part of the fee is offset as provided by Exchange Act Rule 0-11(a)(2) and identify the filing for which the offsetting fee was paid previously. Identify the previous filing by registration statement number, or the Form or Schedule and the date of its filing.
 - (1) Amount Previously Paid:
 - (2) Form, Schedule or Registration Statement No.:
 - (3) Filing Party:
 - (4) Date Filed:

Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. (the "Company") used the following investor presentation in meetings with investors beginning on November 1, 2011. This investor presentation was also posted to the "Biglari Proxy Contest" section of the Company's Investor Relations website, investor.crackerbarrel.com. A screenshot of the "Biglari Proxy Contest" section of the website follows the investor presentation below.



Additional Information

Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. ("the Company") urges caution in considering current trends and earnings guidance disclosed in this presentation. Except for specific historical information, matters discussed in this presentation are forward-looking statements that involve risks, uncertainties and other factors that may cause actual results and performance of the Company to differ materially from those expressed or implied in this discussion. All forward-looking information is provided pursuant to the safe harbor established under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.

More detailed information on risks, uncertainties, and other factors is provided in the Company's filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, press releases and other communications.

Important Additional Information

Cracker Barrel, its directors and certain of its executive officers may be deemed to be participants in the solicitation of proxies from Cracker Barrel shareholders in connection with the matters to be considered at Cracker Barrel's 2011 Annual Meeting. Cracker Barrel has filed a preliminary proxy statement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) in connection with such solicitation of proxies from Cracker Barrel shareholders. When completed, a definitive proxy statement and a form of proxy will be mailed to Cracker Barrel shareholders. When completed, a definitive proxy statement and a form of proxy will be mailed to Cracker Barrel shareholders. INVESTORS AND SHAREHOLDERS ARE STRONGLY ENCOURAGED TO READ THE PRELIMINARY PROXY STATEMENT, THE DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT AND ACCOMPANYING WHITE PROXY CARD AND OTHER DOCUMENTS FILED WITH THE SEC CAREFULLY AND IN THEIR ENTIRETY WHEN THEY BECOME AVAILABLE AS THEY WILL CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION. Detailed information regarding the identity of potential participants, and their direct or indirect interests, by security holdings or otherwise, is set forth in the Proxy Statement and other materials to be filed with the SEC in connection with Cracker Barrel's 2011 Annual Meeting. Shareholders will be able to obtain the Proxy Statement, any amendments or supplements to the proxy statement and other documents filed by Cracker Barrel with the SEC for no charge at the SEC's website at <u>www.sec.gov</u>. Copies will also be available at no charge at the Investor Relations section of our corporate website at crackerbarrel.com.




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Agenda


- I. Overview
- II. Cracker Barrel's History of Success
- III. Ongoing Transformation of the Company
- IV. Other Proxy Matters
- V. Why Biglari is Wrong for Cracker Barrel







Cracker Barrel Proceeds With Planned Succession While Biglari Nominates Himself



Experienced Board of Directors is The Right Team

Board of Directors	Elected	lected Selective Biography					
Michael A. Woodhouse, Executive Chairman	1999	Executive Chairman of the Company since September 12, 2011. Served as Chairman of the Board from 2004 until 2011, at President and CEO of the Company from 2001 until 2010 and as CEO of the Company from 2010 until 2011					
Sandra B. Cochran, President & CEO	2011	Became President and CEO on September 12, 2011 following her service as Cracker Barrel's President and COO, a post she assumed in November 2010 after serving as CFO. Previously served from 2004 until 2009 as CEO of Books-A-Million, Inc. (NASDAQ: BAMM), a leading book retailer in the southeastern United States					
Robert V. Dale, Lead Director	1986	President of Windy Hill Pet Food Company from March 1995 until its sale in July 1998; director of Genesco, Inc. (NYSE: GCO) 2000 to Present					
Names W. Bradford	2011	Dean and Ralph Owen Professor for the Practice of Management at Vanderbilt University's Owen Graduate School of Management. Previously served as President and CEO of United Glass Corporation, a consolidation of glass fabricators in the United States and Canada, from 1999 to 2001. Previously served from 1992 to 1999 as President and CEO of AFG Industries Inc.					
Richard J. Dobkin	2005	Managing Partner of the Tampa, Florida office of Ernst & Young, LLP from 1987 until June 2005					
Charles E. Jones	1981	Founded Corporate Communications, Inc., an investor/shareholder communications and public relations firm where he presently serves as Chairman and CEO					
B.F. (Jack) Lowery	1971	Chairman and CEO of LoJac Companies Inc. He is also a practicing attorney					
William W. McCarten	2011	Chairman of DiamondRock Hospitality Company (NYSE: DRH), a lodging-focused Real Estate Investment Trust that he founded in 2004 and took public in 2005. From 2001 through 2003, was the President of the Marriott Services Group of Marriott International, Inc. Prior to that position, served as President and CEO of HMSHost Corporation which operates restaurants and retail stores in travel venues around the world					
Martha M. Mitchell	1993	Senior Partner and Senior Vice President at Fleishman-Hillard, Inc., an International communications consulting and public relations firm from 1987 until July 2005					
Coleman H. Peterson	2011	President/CEO of Hollis Enterprises, LLC, the human resources consulting firm he founded in 2004 following his service for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. as Chief People Officer from 1994-2004					
Andrea M. Weiss	2003	President and CEO of Retail Consulting, Inc. Served as President of dELIA*s Corp., a multichannel retailer to teenage girls and young women, from May 2001 to October 2002					
Note: Two board memb	ers who are n	ot standing for re-election are not listed					

Cracker Barrel Made a Good Faith Settlement Offer that Biglari Refused

Letter to Sardar Biglari, 22-Aug-2011:

"...in an effort to be constructive, the Board authorized me to make the settlement offer that we discussed on August 1 and August 10."

"Under that offer, we would immediately add to our Board **two mutually** agreed independent directors unaffiliated with Biglari Holdings or any other restaurant company, to be recommended by Biglari Holdings and approved by the Cracker Barrel Board."


"When we spoke on August 10, 2011, you indicated that you would be willing to provide us with your proposed director nominees in connection with this offer..."

- Michael Woodhouse



Key Facts to Consider

Cracker Barrel	Sardar Biglari
 Has outperformed the market and peers over the long term Has a strategy in place for next phase of growth under new CEO Has significantly renewed the board and management with experienced, engaged, energetic leaders Continues to strive for operational excellence and create value for shareholders 	 * Has repeatedly refused to disclose his specific plans for the business * Has previously used proxy fight to gain control without paying a premium to shareholders * Has a history of "extraordinary" turnover in boards after he joins them * As a CEO of a competing restaurant company, would present material business and legal conflicts of interest * Has engaged in what we view as poor corporate governance and self- interested transactions
	Backer Barret Southy Store



The Cracker Barrel Concept

- Owns and operates 608 Old
 Country Stores across 42 states
- Pleasing People[®]—genuine hospitality
- Honest value
- Good country cookin'
- Old-fashioned country store
- Welcome break for travelers







Retail is Integral to the Cracker Barrel Experience

- Guest waiting area
- Rockers on the front porch
- Gifts for under \$20
- Regional products
- Cracker Barrel branded foods
- Exclusive music









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
CEO Sandy Cochran Brings Experience, Energy and a Plan to Grow Traffic, Sales, Profits and Shareholder Value






CBRL Strategic Initiatives

4 Innovative Tactics Driving Retail Sales Growth Deliver Value & Connection With the Brand	 Emphasize unique and proprietary items such as Cracker Barrel branded food, regional offerings, and new exclusive doll line Highlight affordability with strong price points and prominent locations for giftable offerings
5 Focused Cost Reduction Offset Commodity Pressure	 New system expected to reduce labor cost 10-20bps Controlling food waste, supplies, maintenance and transportation expenses \$10mm annual savings from staff reductions
6 Balanced Approach to Capital Allocation Enhance Shareholder Value	 Investments in new store growth that are accretive to shareholder value Steady return of capital including 13.6% increase in quarterly dividend & \$65mm share repurchase authorization New \$750mm credit facility





Shareholder-Friendly Rights Plan Keeps Biglari From Creeping Control

Adopted in response to Biglari Holdings' clearance under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act to acquire up to 49.99% of the Company's common stock

Shareholder friendly provisions:

- Rights plan would not be triggered by acquisitions pursuant to all-cash, fully financed tender offers that remain open for a minimum of 60 business days ("qualifying offers")
- Rights plan is focused on creeping acquisitions above 10% and would not deter a non-coercive cash offer for all shares
- Rights expire if shareholders do not approve rights plan at December 2011 annual meeting
- If shareholders approve, rights would expire in September 2014

Biglari's Argument that the Rights Plan Was Not Necessary Is Belied by His Own Words in Biglari Holdings' 2010 Letter From The Chairman:

"In fulfilling that objective, we will require favorable investment opportunities, **preferably controlling interests** in businesses with diverse operating and financial traits."

"We are control investors..."



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Management Paid Based on Long Term Value Creation

- Cracker Barrel's central compensation objectives:
 - Reward performance
 - Align executives' interests with interests of shareholders
 - Attract and retain talented executives
- Base salaries generally targeted at 60th percentile, and bonuses generally targeted at 50th percentile of peer group
- Strong pay-for-performance philosophy. In 2011, 79% of CEO's compensation and 72% of other named
 officers' compensation was "at risk" based upon Company performance
- As described in our Proxy, CBRL's annual and long-term incentive compensation plans are designed to be deductible under Section 162(m) of the I.R.C., and provide discretion to the Board's Compensation Committee in awarding incentive compensation, subject to a threshold of performance
- The Compensation Committee has exercised its discretion by establishing plans that reward achievement of the following objectives:
 - Year-over-year improvement in Income from Operations (annual incentive plan)
 - Improvement in ROIC (long-term incentive plan)
 - Improvement in Total Shareholder Return (long-term incentive plan)
- In fiscal 2011, the Company paid annual bonuses to named executive officers equal to 91% of target, which was 45% of the maximum potential bonus

Management Incentives Aligned with Shareholder Interests




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Plan to Collapse Holding Company Will Save Money

- Cracker Barrel Old Country Store (i.e. Holding Company) will be merged with the wholly owned operating company subsidiary, CBOCS, Inc.
 - Holding Company was originally formed in 1998 to oversee CBOCS and potentially for other businesses acquired
 - Although the Holding Company has owned and operated other businesses, it now only owns and operates CBOCS
- Why now? The previous credit facility did not allow this merger, however, the new credit facility does, making these cost savings possible
- Holding company format no longer necessary, its elimination will allow us to:
 - Realize tax and other savings of approximately \$2mm per year
 - Simplify the corporate structure
 - Facilitate more efficient cash management
- Merging the two companies is in the best interest of shareholders






	Cracker Barrel
x	Has repeatedly refused to disclose his specific plans for the business
x	Gained initial board representation at Steak 'n Shake and then took control over time without paying a premium, with most Board members exiting the Board after he joined it
x	Slashed operational investment at Steak 'n Shake – focused only on short-term
x	Proposed excessive compensation plan for himself
x	Proposed dual class of stock at Biglari Holdings for acquisitions – has delayed special meeting twice, and now "on hold"
x	Returns little cash to shareholders
×	Presence on our Board would create a serious conflict of interest – he is the CEO of a family restaurant competitor and CEO of a restaurant acquisition vehicle
	Recher

Biglari's Rhetoric Changes Over Time and Cannot be Relied On

Target	Original Announced Intentions	Actual Actions Taken / Result
Cid Country Store	 13-Jun-2011 13D: "The Reporting Persons intend to evaluate their investment in the Shares on a continuous basis." 23-Sep-2011: "we told Chairman Michael Woodhouse that we have purchased stock for investment purposes only." 	 23-Jun-2011: Demanded Board seats for himself and P. Cooley 26-Aug-2011: Filed HSR to acquire up to 49.99% of CBRL shares 1-Sep-2011: Launched Proxy Fight 8-Sept-2011: Borrowed \$83.2 million through subsidiary to up-stream a cash dividend to Biglari Holdings
Fintendly is	 7-Aug-2006 13D: "The Reporting Persons have acquired their Shares of the Issuer for investment. The Reporting Persons evaluate their investment in the Shares on a continual basis." 	 11-Dec-2006: Launched Proxy Fight 17-Jun-2007: Friendly's announces acquisition by Sun Capital (BH was not involved)
WESTERN	 10-Nov-2005 13D: "The Reporting Persons intend to evaluate the business prospects of the Issuer, as well as its present and future intentions." 	 1-Dec-2005: Biglari appointed to the Board of Directors 22-Oct-2009: Western Sizzlin announces Merger Agreement with Steak 'n Shake
	 17-Aug-2007 13D: "The Reporting Persons acquired the Securities for investment purposes." 	 12-Aug-2007: Biglari first requests board seats for himself and Cooley 7-Mar-2008: Biglari elected to the Board of Directors 8-Aug-2008: Biglari appointed CEO 8-Apr-2010: Company renamed Biglari Holdings
urce: Public filings	Racher	



Biglari Enters... ...Existing Board Members Leave

Name	Resigned 7	Name	Resigned ?	Name	Director	Role	Age	Background
Paul C. Schorr	1	Roger D. Sack	1	Sardar Biglari	2008	Chairman of the Board, CEO	34	Director of Western Sizzlin' since 2005
Jones Yorke	1	Stanley L. Bozeman, Jr.	1			Vice Chairman of the Board & Independent Director		Director of Western Sizzlin' since 2005
				Phillip	2008		67	 Advisory Director of Biglani Capital since 2000
Alan Cowart	*	Jesse M. Harrington		Cooley	2008		07	 Biglari's professor at Trinity University, Prassel Distinguished Professor of
Thomas M. Hontzas	1	Pat Vezertzis	,	a la serie a				Business Administration
monities interneties		Pat vezer uns						Served as a Director of
Titus W. Greene ¹	NA			Kenneth	2010	Independent Director	66	Western Sizzlin' Corp. from 2007 to 2010
				Cooper				 His law practice concentrates on real estate transactions
After B		the Steak 'n Shake Boa -Mar-08)	rd				-	
			100 Mar 199					 Chancellor and Professor of Management, University of
Name	Resigned ?	Name	Resigned ?	Ruth Person	2002	Independent Director	65	Michigan-Flint Served as President of Boar
Fred Risk	*	Edward W. Wilhelm	*					of Directors of Workforce Development Strategies, Inc.
Geoffrey Ballotti	1	Steven M. Schmidt	1					
John W. Ryan ²	NA	Wayne L. Kelley	1					
Ruth J. Person	Current	and the second second	The sector					
trce: Public Filings	the WSC Board	until the Company merged w	th SNS.					
		til his death earlier this year		ROCKER				

We Are Not the Only Ones Who Think Biglari's Governance Record is Poor

"...there does not appear to be any desire to appreciate or be receptive to other points of view on the board of directors than the current Steak 'n Shake chairman's position...

...although our current chairman and CEO [Biglari] espoused openness and transparency, the opposite has been the case. The board has not been actively involved in developing the vision and strategy of the business, but rather has been informed about it belatedly." -Wayne L. Kelley, Former Steak 'n Shake CEO; 22-Mar-2009

"The unanimous vote [to transform Steak 'n Shake into Biglari Holdings] came after **Biglari, the board chairman, managed to push out every board member** unwilling to give him dictatorial authority over Steak 'n Shake despite his relatively modest ownership stake."

-Indianapolis Business Journal; 6-Feb-2010

Note: Permission to use quotes was neither sought nor obtained





...And Focused on His **Own Compensation Public Reaction Compensation Package Overview** Biglari's proposed compensation at Biglari Holdings provided him with 25% of the gain in "One of the sweetest compensation arrangements book value over the annual hurdle rate of 5% I've ever seen at a public company - one that would deeply cut into shareholder returns" with no cap - Richard Gibbons, The Motley Fool; May 2010 If the \$300mm book value increased 10%, Biglari would receive ~\$4mm "The pay is too rich for such little growth" This is in addition to his \$900k annual - Ken Skarbeck, Managing Partner, base salary Aldebaran Capital; Aug-2010 Hand-picked Governance, Compensation, and Nominating committee, unanimously approved the agreement "The current system, as proposed, is ridiculous by itself and, additionally, runs contrary to the ethos Mr. Biglari claimed to have when nominating himself for election to the Board of Steak 'n Shake. "The decision by the Board of Biglari Holdings (BH) Following adverse shareholder and ISS to accept such a generous and easily manipulated response, Biglari revised his proposal compensation system, demonstrates they either fail increasing the hurdle rate to 6% and installing to understand the nuances of the proposal or they an annual cap at \$10mm are simply unwilling to take a stand against Mr. **Biglari** Biglari received \$1.2 million prorated incentive - NFI Shareholder Letter to Biglari; May 2010, payment under this plan for the first quarter it was in place (4Q of FY 11) Source: BH Annual Meeting Proxy Statement Note: Permission to use quotes was neither so ught nor obtained 35

...And Maintaining Control Despite His Minority Ownership

Biglari's Dual Class Stock Proposal

- Biglari is attempting to create a dual class of stock, which would enable him to consolidate voting rights in BH to himself
 - Under the proposal Class B shares = 1/5 Economic and 1/100 Voting Rights
 - * Could enhance his voting control and reduce voting power of future shareholders of Biglari Holdings
 - Class B stock would be his currency for future acquisitions
- But given shareholder challenges to these proposals, these actions are "on hold"



Biglari Oddly Views His Shareholders' Money as His Own


"I have invested about \$100 million in the stock of Cracker Barrel whereas the entire Board since 2003 has spent a total of \$251,600 in purchasing stock in the open market."

-Biglari's letter to CBRL shareholders, 12 September 2011

Biglari does <u>not</u> personally own any stock directly in Cracker Barrel – Biglari Holdings and the Lion Fund do.

If Biglari really views a public company's ownership as his own, what other governance issues do we not know about at Biglari Holdings?











Biglari Slashed Capital Expenditures, But Paid to Put His Picture in Every Restaurant




Key Message From Your Current Board

Sardar Biglari is wrong for our shareholders

- We are a strong company and a leader in the industry
- We have delivered strong results over time, and have the strategy to continue to drive performance
- Our current board is actively involved at Cracker Barrel and continuously seeks to create value
- We believe Biglari is dedicated to Biglari not the best interests of all Cracker Barrel shareholders
- We believe Biglari's playbook of creeping control and poor corporate governance will harm Cracker Barrel and its shareholders





Site Shop